After the jury at my trial returned a verdict in my favor
 trial judge Frank Buczynski exposed his bias in favor of
Community Medical Center and exposed his prejudice
 regarding the evidence by stating that my termination
 by the hospital was warranted because of my admitted
 record keeping oversights. Buczynski made the
 aforementioned statement about the justification
 for my termination despite:

1. the evidence presented at trial that my termination was
 for a fabricated reason, namely for being a substandard
 record keeper since a record keeping standard
 did not exist at Community Medical Center;  

2. the evidence presented at trial that the investigation that
 directly lead to my termination was irrelevant to the
 detection of narcotic theft that precipitated
 the investigation; 

3. the complete absence at trial of credible evidence that
 potential harm to patients could have resulted because
 of my record keeping oversights;

(note: the complete transcript of the trial testimony of Community Medical Center's expert/paid witness who claimed that my record keeping offenses were serious will be presented on this page) 

4. the evidence presented at trial that my termination was against written hospital policy that specified a written reprimand for
 my first record keeping citation in ten years; 

5. the arguably overwhelming evidence presented at trial that supported my claim of criminal retaliation regarding 
the staging of the morphine theft that precipitated the
 investigation that directly lead to my termination.       

Buczynski, who lives on Andover Road, Forked River (New Jersey) clearly wanted me to lose at trial.

Because he wanted me to lose at trial Buczynski denied my request to present the at-hand evidence of my losses to the jury at my trial.  

But Buczynski DID NOT HAVE the discretion to make that denial, because his well-known duty was to apply the remedial intent of the law; Buczynski knew very well his duty.  

There is also a precedent judicial ruling that punitive damages cannot be awarded to a trial-winning plaintiff if there is no compensatory award. 

(note: The adherence to court rules and precedent law would seem absurd in my case since my case exposes corrupt judges who lie, deceive, and ignore precedent case law when the adherence to that case law contradicts their intended corrupt actions.)    

Prior to the trial in my case I informed Buczynski on no less than nine occasions of my claim that Community Medical Center (hereinafter CMC) staged the criminal morphine theft that was falsely attributed to me.

One of the aforementioned nine occasions on which I explicitly informed Buczynski that his judicial colleagues Serpentelli and Oles protected CMC regarding the violation of criminal law was via a 14-page letter that I hand delivered to the office of each judge at the Ocean County Superior Court. 

The aforementioned 14-page letter was delivered three months before the trial in my case (click to see a copy of that letter that was also copied to the editor of the Asbury Park Press, then click the Back button to return to this presentation).

Buczynski was well aware prior to trial of my claim of criminal retaliation regarding the set up for morphine theft that precipitated my litigation, yet he stated on record after my presentation of presumably overwhelming supporting evidence at trial that he did not make a determination that CMC staged the retaliatory set up.

I supported my claim of criminal set up in part because the discovery of the morphine theft was the result of a non-routine procedure by CMC nurse Cabellero two hours after the morphine theft that coincidentally involved one of her assigned patients. At trial Burke testified that the non-routine procedure in question, namely the obtaining of a Pyxis activity summary, was absolutely routine procedure (click to see a photocopy of Burke's pertinent trial transcript):

Q    Okay. Is that standard operating procedure to obtain a Pyxis activity report?

A    Sure. Absolutely.

However, Caballero testified that the obtaining of a Pyxis activity summary was not routine procedure (click to see a photocopy of Cabellero’s pertinent trial transcript, then click the Back button to return to this presentation).

I have no doubt that Caballero:
a. was recruited by CMC administrators to steal my identity;
b. carried out the morphine theft in this case on behalf of CMC; 
c. and then subsequently told a CMC security-department representative that I talk to the nurses about a gun collection.

I cannot account for Cabellero’s truthful and incriminating testimony that the obtaining of a Pyxis activity summary was not routine procedure regarding the obtaining of a narcotic, but I suspect that she recognized that my questioning was exposing an inconsistency between her pre-litigation statement and reality, and that she did not want to be caught in a blatant lie. 

In her statement Caballero claimed that she obtained the activity summary because she did not have her care plans (click to see a photocopy of Caballero’s statement). 

Yet Caballero testified at trial that she would consult her care plans after obtaining the activity summary (click to read line 11/page 203 of a transcript photocopy of Caballero's testimony). 

Caballero obtained the activity summary because she did not have her care plans, yet she would consult her care plans without removing a narcotic from Pyxis after obtaining the activity summary; in other words there was no reason to obtain an activity summary if one’s reason for that action was the unavailability of nursing care plans. 

Caballero knew that the medical care plan had to be consulted in order to verify the existence of a physician order that authorized the administration of a narcotic, and that the medical care plan (and not the activity summary) provided the needed dosing schedule for the administration.

Further, Caballero knew that the appearance of a withdrawn narcotic on an activity summary did not equate to the administration of the narcotic to the associated patient; indeed, the  premise of Burke's harassing investigation of my nursing records is that a Pyxis record of narcotic removal does not equate to its administration to a patient.      

I questioned Burke about my suspension and the events on the night of the morphine thefts. Burke testified that my suspension was appropriate and that it was a measure to maintain safety; narcotics were in fact missing, and apparently Burke considered me a threat in the complete absence of indicators that I was a substance abuser, and despite the fact that I was a long-time, above average employee of CMC (click to see a photocopy of Burke's relevant testimony).  

However, despite the possibility that I might have had a problem with narcotics (click to read Burke's testimony), I was not tested for narcotic use. 

In consideration of Burke's stated concern for the maintaining of safety within the hospital neither she or security representative McCarthy took a single relevant action to determine my guilt or innocence regarding the morphine theft; those two investigators did not take a single action relevant to the detection of narcotic theft by anybody.
Instead of investigating narcotic theft Burke and McCarthy directed their efforts to uncovering commonplace record keeping oversights that I unintentionally made regarding my nursing records.

The failure to legitimately investigate the morphine theft is obviously consistent with a set up for morphine theft scenario. 

Burke testified at trial that, contrary to the sworn testimony of corporate labor relations director Manzo,  she did not initially inform him of a number of charting oversights that were made by a nurse but rather informed him of the reason for my suspension, namely that a narcotic was stolen (click to see a photocopy of Burke's relevant transcript at trial).

But Manzo testified that he was completely unaware of the morphine theft, or of any narcotic theft, in my case until two years after that theft (click to read a transcript of Manzo's deposition testimony).  
Of course I know that Burke was a powerless nursing administrator, and that she neither suggested the set up or authorized its execution; those decisions to commit criminal offenses that included conspiracy were made by someone who was  considerably higher on the corporate ladder within the Saint Barnabas Health Care System.   

Burke testified at trial that I was suspended (click to see a photocopy of Burke's relevant transcript) because of the morphine theft (click to see a photocopy of Burke's relevant transcript), yet several days later trial judge Buczynski objected to my arguably damaging questioning of security representative McCarthy. I was attempting to show the jury that McCarthy's investigation was irrelevant to the detection of narcotic theft that precipitated that investigation, hence that the investigation was harassing and retaliatory. 

Buczynski claimed that my questioning regarding narcotic theft was irrelevant to this case because, according to Buczynski, I was not accused of narcotic theft (click to see a transcript photocopy of Buczynski's statement).

Buczynski's objection was not only a blatant attempt to interfere with my effort to establish the legal element of retaliation/causal connection regarding my termination for a trumped up excuse (substandard record keeping), but it was also a blatant effort to protect CMC by eliminating the retaliatory criminal  set up (for morphine theft) from being addressed by the jury.

Buczynski's objection also contradicted  the pre-trial Appellate Division court (a higher court) that made the morphine theft relevant to this case by stating: 

"The temporal proximity between his complaint to the State Board of Health ...and his suspension on January 8 2001, permits an inference of a causal connection" (click to see a photocopy of the Appellate Division's statement). 
"Although plaintiff was originally suspended because he was suspected of morphine theft, he was never asked to take a drug test" (click to see a photocopy of the Appellate Division's statement).

After the jury returned a verdict in my favor Buczunski stated that my termination for my admitted record keeping oversights was justified, and stated that my record keeping oversights could have caused potential harm to the associated patients (click to see a transcript photocopy of Buczynski's statements).

Buczynski premised his statements regarding harm to patients on the purely rhetorical testimony of CMC's paid expert/medical witness who claimed that my record keeping oversights were serious (click to read the complete transcript of CMC's expert medical witness Dr. Ratner).

Buczynski's aforementioned statements regarding harm to patients (because of my record keeping oversights) were completely unsupported by tangible evidence; this can be verified by reading the testimony transcript of CMC's expert medical witness.  

For example, I failed to make a duplicate record regarding Xanax (a narcotic anti-anxiety agent)  that I administered to a patient pursuant to a physician's order; there was no tangible evidence provided to demonstrate that the associated patient was endangered in any way by this oversight. 

As another example, I did not manually override an automatic time notation regarding a scheduled 2PM Xanax administration that was actually administered at about 4PM. Those who have knowledge regarding the pharmacology of Xanax know that the time differential in question is meaningless; for this reason no tangible evidence could be provided by CMC's expert medical witness that the differential could have resulted in harm to the associated patient.       
My specific record keeping offenses can be verified by reading a photocopy of Oles' written opinion regarding his dismissal of my case that I later won before a jury (click to see a photocopy of Oles' written opinion).

My record keeping offenses involved the antianxiety agents Xanax, Valium, and the analgesic agents Percocet and Darvocet that are all widely prescribed for use ouside the clinical setting due to their inherent safety in the absence of gross abuse or intentional overdose.

It is noteworthy that I won a trial based upon evidence that was concealed by Oles. 

Presumably rational readers recognize the complete absence of evidence in favor of CMC.
Only when my case was certain to proceed to trial before a jury did CMC employ a paid/expert medical witness; no paid witnesses were employed by CMC at the time of Oles' pre-trial dismissal of my case.

Rational observers will recognize that since the fix was in for Oles to dismiss my case the added expense and effort of employing a paid witness on behalf of CMC was not needed.

After verifying my specific oversights one can recognize the mendacity of Dr. Ratner's testimony; he states that my record keeping oversights were serious without providing a single piece of tangible evidence to support his testimony.
Dr. Ratner provides testimony about heparin infusions, morphine infusions, liver impairment, and a medical condition known as triplopia none of which were relevant to my case.
Dr. Ratner's testimony was completely irrelevant because it could not create a written charting standard at CMC to define substandard charting  that was used as an excuse to terminate me.
However Buczynski overruled my objection that Ratner's testimony was irrelevant; it is arguable that Buczynski hoped that the jury would be impressed by Dr. Ratner's specious rhetoric, and that they would return a verdict in favor of CMC. 
Rational visitors to this web site presumably recognize that Buczynski is a deceiving liar. Buczynski shares a trait with successful con men and convincing liars; specifically he is outwardly affable, and I am ashamed to admit that I was duped by Buczynski into believing that he would ensure that I received a fair trial in accordance with legislative intent. 

I even excused Buczynski's action of allowing me to unknowingly rest my case without providing the evidence of my losses to the jury; within hours after the trial I realized that the honoring of legislative intent mandated that Buczynski ensure that the jury heard the evidence of my losses either before the return of a verdict or after the verdict was returned in my favor. Only after the excitement of the trial had diminished did I realize Buczynski's corruption.      

Prior to trial the litigants exchange pre-trial information; this includes a listing of the evidence that will be presented at trial, a proposed set of instructions to the jury that is known as a jury charge, and a proposed jury verdict form. 

The aforementioned pre-trial information is also provided to the trial judge prior to trial. 

Prior to trial the lawyer representing CMC sent to me a letter that informed me that he would object to the introduction into evidence at trial of my losses; I of course provided a listing of those losses to Buczynski prior to trial, therefore he was aware of my $50,000 legal fees and my loss of five year's wages (click to see a photocopy of that letter written by CMC's attorney).    

On the Introduction page of this web site I cited the case law that established that the whistle blowing law is to be considered remedial legislation that must be liberally interpreted in order to encourage the conscientious whistle blowing that benefits society. 

On the page illustrating Oles' corruption I reviewed the legal elements that had to be established in order to win the trial, and mention of losses is not one of the required legal elements, therefore I intended to mention my losses to the jury during my closing statement. 

I could not conceive of a more monstrous and unjust judicial action than Buczynski using my error as an excuse to deny to me a chance to recover my losses as a result of the actions taken against me by CMC.

Incredibly Buczynski stated the need to be fair and just, and used that excuse in order to justify his denial of my request to present the evidence of my losses to the jury (click to see a transcript photocopy of Buczynski's statement).

The evidence supporting CMC's guilt of violating both civil and criminal law is overwhelming in my case, yet Buczynski protected CMC by ensuring that they were not held accountable; the content of Buczynski's character is obvious regarding his need to be fair and just.

The absence of remedies to a trial-winning whistle blower contradicted the established remedial legislative intent of the whistle blowing law that was cited by the pre-trial Appellate Division court. But I suspect that Buczynski thought that I would not appeal a trial that I won, therefore he arguably believed that his corruption would be concealed since my case would end with the trial.

On the last day of trial I requested that I be allowed to repeat the trial in order to present the evidence of my losses to the jury; Buczynski denied my request and told me the lie that a new trial could only be ordered by the Appellate Division (click to see a transcript photocopy of Buczynski's brazen lie). 

On the last day of the trial Buczynski instructed me regarding the filing of an appeal that he undoubtedly believed that I would not file (click to see a transcript photocopy of that instruction). 

On the last day of the trial Buczynski instructed me regarding the filing of an appeal (to the Appellate Division); Buczynski did not instruct me to file a motion (request) to him for a new trial. 

After I filed an appeal of a trial that I won Buczynski was contacted by the Appellate Division, hence Buczynski's fraud that he perpetrated in order to cover up his lie that new trials could only be ordered by the Appellate Division. 
One last topic that I will address regarding the last day of the trial is Buczynski's brazen attempt to protect CMC regarding the violation of criminal law.

During my opening statement to the jury at my trial I told them that I was going to show them the evidence that supported my often-repeated claim of criminal retaliation regarding the set up for morphine theft (click to see a transcript photocopy of my statement).
One of the pre-trial requests that I submitted to Buczynski was that the jury decide CMC's guilt of staging the morphine theft (click to see a photocopy of my proposed jury verdict form).

(click to see a photocopy of a transcript segment from 3 March that shows Buczynski's acknowledgment of his reversible error regarding his deliberate effort to protect CMC).
As I stated previously Buczynski was very aware of my relevant claim of retaliation regarding the criminal set up , yet he demonstrated his prejudice and corruption by stating that such a question was not necessary for jury consideration (click to see a photocopy of Buczynski's statement that exposed his clear attempt to protect CMC regarding the violation of criminal law).   


Only in the most corrupt state in the country could an oversight entity also be corrupt. 

After the cover up by the Advisory Committee for Judicial Conduct (hereinafter ACJC) of Oles' corruption I wanted further proof that the ACJC covers up evidence of judicial corruption. 

On the page that illustrates Oles' corruption I demonstrated, presumably clearly,  how he attempted to conceal overwhelming evidence in my favor and how he attempted to conceal evidence of criminal wrong doing by Community Medical Center (hereinafter CMC).
On this page I demonstrated how Buczynski lied to me and how he deceived me, and how he defeated the intent of the whistle blowing law. 

I also demonstrated how Buczynski protected CMC regarding criminal retaliation.
I presented detailed evidence of Buczynski's transparent corruption to the ACJC, and the ACJC responded with a three-sentence letter that made no reference to evidence and that made no mention of Buczynski's name; the letter merely stated that there is nothing to warrant the re-opening of the ACJC's file regarding my case (click to see a photocopy of that letter from the ACJC).  

There can be no rational argument against my claim that the ACJC is corrupt and that it exists solely to protect a corrupt judiciary.    

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