CORRUPT DEFEAT OF NEW JERSEY'S CONSCIENTIOUS EMPLOYEE PROTECTION ACT

 

INTRODUCTION

Accepting a bribe to fix a case in a court of law is no different from accepting from a political boss a judicial position, a $170,000 annual salary, and lavish employment benefits in return for an agreement to corrupt the law upon command.

A judicial position and its associated perks is called a benefit, and the law allows the compensation for honest judicial performance. 

However, regarding the acceptance of a benefit there is no provision for an occasional judicial disregard of the law and of legislative intent, or an occasional judicial prejudice regarding facts presented in court. 

Accordingly, any such malicious and deliberate judicial breach of trust cannot be lawfully compensated by a benefit. 

In other words, the law does not allow compensation for demonstrably corrupt judicial actions that are taken in order to either obtain or retain a benefit; accepting the aforementioned benefit in this case constitutes the acceptance of a bribe according to
 N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2.    
 

Presented on this page is a summary of my case that makes factual statements; those factual statements are supported in detail on subsequent pages via links that jump to photocopies of tangible evidence. After linking to the photocopies of the evidence the reader can click the Back button located in the upper left hand corner of the screen in order to return to the previous presentation.

This web site is arranged like a textbook, but instead of chapters there are numbered pages. Therefore an understanding of the presentation on one page might require an understanding of the presentation that appears on previous pages.

This story involves two phenomena that do not commonly occur
and that would therefore seemingly interest those who read newspapers:

1) a whistle blowing RN at Community Medical Center (CMC) in Toms River, New Jersey who was accused of morphine theft shortly after registering a complaint with the state Department of Health and Senior Services, won a trial while representing himself against the giant Saint Barnabas Health Care System that presumably never before lost a whistle blowing trial, and that certainly never lost a whistle blowing trial to an RN who represented himself after first winning the reversal of a corrupt dismissal of his case by a local judge;

2) tangible evidence of judicial corruption both within the Ocean County Superior Court and within the state’s highest court resulted because of the whistle blowing by the RN in question.

The people’s best defense against a corrupt government is an honest media, yet two of New Jersey’s largest newspapers, the Asbury Park Press and the Newark Star Ledger, ignored this story that involved demonstrable, egregious, and organized governmental corruption.
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While employed as an RN at Community Medical Center (CMC) I registered a complaint with the state Department of Health regarding a nursing practice at CMC of applying diapers to mentally impaired bedridden patients who were known to be incontinent. Prior to registering my complaint I tried for several years to get that issue (the application of diapers to bedridden patients) addressed by my immediate nursing superiors, however my repeated efforts were ignored. I finally registered my complaint after my repeated written requests were ignored by the executive director of CMC Nancy Wollen.

Because of the use of auxiliary bed sheets in case of incontinence the diapers served only to conceal waste and prolong its contact with the skin that demonstrably caused skin breakdown and could easily lead to infection once that breakdown occurred. I was intimately aware of nursing routine at CMC, and I can testify that known-incontinent, diaper-clad, mentally-impaired patients were routinely left unmonitored regarding the condition of their diapers.

After my termination from CMC the state Department of Health conducted a demonstrably incompetent investigation* (that may have been deliberately incompetent) of my complaint and proclaimed it to be unfounded. My concern was primarily for mentally impaired patients who could not make their needs known. The state's investigation interviewed only those who could answer questions, and it reported the complete absence of diapers anywhere on the nursing unit that was visited. After the state's investigation a former co-worker at CMC told me that diapers were still being stocked and used in the aforementioned nursing unit.

The state conducted its investigation after I had been terminated from CMC, therefore I could not guide the investigator and ensure a competent investigation.

* note: This web site demonstrates that the Saint Barnabas Health Care System bought protection (regarding the violation of civil and criminal law) not only by Superior Court judges but also by the federal attorney assigned to New Jersey (Christopher Christie) as well as by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Therefore it is not inconceivable that the Saint Barnabas Health Care System can buy the results of any investigation (public or private) into its operations. It is not inconceivable that the Saint Barnabas Health Care System can buy awards, or that it can buy favorable mention in New Jersey's corrupt media.
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO MY COMPLAINT REGISTRATION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

1. CMC retaliated against me by arranging the theft of my identity that was then used to stage a morphine theft that was attributed to me and that resulted in my immediate suspension.

2. I was investigated by law enforcement, and the stigma of morphine theft was attached to my name.

3. While still suspended I was invited to resign from CMC. My refusal to resign resulted in an irrelevant investigation (to narcotic theft) by CMC that directly lead to my termination against written hospital policy for the trumped up excuse of being a substandard record keeper regarding admitted but commonplace duplicate record keeping oversights that are known by all nurses everywhere to occur; a single record existed in all instances regarding my oversights.

Presumably rational readers are curious about the fact that I was initially suspended after being accused of morphine theft, then fired for being a substandard record keeper.

4. I retained the first of four disappointing lawyers and filed litigation claiming the violation of the whistle blowing law.

5. I was unable to obtain re-employment as an RN. After exhausting my life savings of about $50,000 on legal fees (after being unemployed for two years) I represented myself rather than give up.

6. My case was fixed and was thrown out by an Ocean County Superior Court judge by the name of Edward Oles who in order to justify the fix for the record brazenly lied in court documents and concealed overwhelming evidence in my favor, and attempted to completely conceal evidence of criminal wrong doing by CMC regarding the staging of the morphine theft. Oles stated in a written opinion that there is "absolutely no evidence" in this case that is in my favor, yet I won an eventual trial based upon the evidence that he concealed. I won the aforementioned trial on my first occasion before a jury while fighting both a well-experienced trial lawyer and a corrupt trial judge; the conditions under which I won my trial implies the strength of the evidence that Oles attempted to conceal.

7. I appealed the dismissal of my case by Oles, and I won a reversal of that dismissal. However my change of venue requests in order to have my trial far removed from the influence of the Saint Barnabas Health Care System were denied by Ocean County Superior Court judge Frank Buczynski, by the Appellate Division, and by the state supreme court.

8. I won a six-day jury trial. But I unknowingly failed to present to the jury at the proper time the ready evidence of my losses; I planned to show the jury that evidence upon my closing statement at the end of trial. Shortly after resting my case trial judge Buczynski told me that even if I won I could not recover my losses nor could I obtain punitive damages as a result of the actions taken against me by CMC (these are known as remedies). Because of a pre-trial exchange of information Buczynski knew about the evidence of my losses that included five years of lost wages and $50,000 lost to the payment of legal fees. 

Buczynski also knew that my career as a nurse had been destroyed; despite my record and credentials (see the page devoted to the demonstration of Oles' corruption) I was unable to become re-employed; I have clearly been blacklisted. 

But Buczynski denied my request to show the jury the evidence of my substantial losses as a result of being criminally set up for morphine theft. Buczynski also made sure that the jury did not decide CMC's guilt of staging the criminal set up for morphine theft that started this case.

9. I appealed at great expense the outcome of a trial that I won; presumably such appeals are not common. There were two arguments of my appeal:
a) the trial resulted in the absence of remedies (because of a technicality) despite the well known remedial intent of the law, and despite the obvious fact that the only reason for trial in my case was to obtain remedies;
b) Buczynski committed a reversible error when he clearly and deliberately prevented the jury at my trial from deciding CMC's guilt of staging the retaliatory morphine theft that was attributed to me.

10. However, I encountered Appellate Division judge Howard Kestin who was as demonstrably corrupt as Oles and Buczynski*. After Kestin denied my appeal I then appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court hoping that it would honor the clear legislative intent of the law; however that court also denied my appeal for a new trial so that I could obtain the remedies that are the intent of the law, and so that CMC could be held accountable for criminal retaliation.

*The ease with which their corruption is demonstrated suggests that their corruption is protected, and that they know that they will not be held accountable.  The corruption of each of these three judges is demonstrated on separate pages. 
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THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE WHISTLE BLOWING LAW

The pre-trial Appellate Division judge who overturned Edward Oles’ dismissal of my case cited the well-known legislative intent of the whistle blowing law:

"CEPA was enacted to protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities… courts construe CEPA (whistle blowing law) liberally since it is designated as remedial legislation."

In a decision (not regarding my case) by the New Jersey Supreme Court dated 27 July 2007 it was stated:

"CEPA is remedial social legislation designed to promote two complementary public purposes: to protect and thereby encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities… our goal in the interpretation of a statute is always to determine the
legislature’s intent… a single guiding principle has instructed our interpretation of CEPA in the decades since its enactment. As broad, remedial legislation the statute must be construed liberally".


The intent of the law that was cited by the Appellate Division and by the New Jersey Supreme Court was consistently disregarded in my case as evidenced by:
-gross judicial prejudice regarding the treatment of evidence;
-the complete absence of remedies to a trial winning whistleblower despite the established remedial intent of the law.

In the summer of 2009 United States Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor stated before a congressional committee that

"the task of a judge is not to make law, it is to apply the law".

The whistleblowing law has only one application, and that application is to encourage conscientious whistleblowing by providing remedies to whistleblowers who win at trial.

However, whistleblowing is discouraged in the extreme when remedies (ie reinstatement of employment and the return of lost wages) are denied a trial-winning whistleblower because of a courtroom technical error. 

A corrupt Buczynski and every corrupt judge and corrupt justice associated with my case knew what Sotomayor knew about a judge's task regarding the application of law.
  
Nothing about my case encourages conscientious whistleblowing, but rather my case proves that whistleblowing in New Jersey is folly if the judiciary can be bought by an employer/defendant in a whistleblowing litigation.

The denial of remedies because of a technical and unknowing error by a trial winning whistleblower/RN, who represented himself (out of necessity) during his first occasion before a jury, is an obvious and gross perversion of the well-known remedial intent of the whistleblowing law.

The denial of remedies to a trial winning whistleblower because of a technicality is inconsistent with a liberal interpretation of the law, and it is consistent with the judicial acceptance of bribes from a connected interest.  

The legislative intent of the whistleblowing law, without the slightest question,  prohibits because of a technical error in courtroom procedure the denial of remedies to a trial-winning whistleblower. 

The judicial actions in my case that were transparently biased in favor of CMC and the Saint Barnabas Health Care System (SBHCS)could only have only been motivated by the acceptance of bribes.  

Buczynski had the discretion to allow me to present the evidence of my losses to a jury, and that judicial discretion would have been interpreted as an effort to honor the remedial intent of the law. However it is undeniable that Buczynski wanted me to lose at trial.

Buczynski did not have the discretion to allow the complete denial of remedies, because of a technicality, to a trial-winning whistleblower; his excuse that he could not permit me to show the jury the evidence of my losses exposes his corruption and the fact that he is a  purposeful liar.   

Buczynski's disregard of legislative intent is comparable to Oles' disregard of that intent:

a) Buczynski defeated the remedial intent of the law by ensuring that I received no remedies even though I won at trial;

b) Oles dismissed my case in the presence of evidence that later enabled me to win a trial while fighting not only CMC's well experienced trial lawyer but also a corrupt trial judge (Buczynski).

Oles took a bribe that explains his attempted concealment of overwhelming evidence that enabled me to win a subsequent trial. 

Buczynski took a bribe that explains his use of my trial error as an excuse to deny remedies to me despite the well-known remedial intent of the law; Buczynski knew that judicial discretion did not allow him to disregard that remedial intent regardless of my error. 

Buczynski transparently completed the effort started by Oles to deny to me the protection afforded by the whistleblowing act.

Oles and Buczynski aided CMC in the complete absence of evidence in its favor, and in the presence of overwhelming evidence of its civil and criminal culpability.

Oles and Buczynski protected CMC from being held accountable for its malicious destruction of my nursing career, and from being held accountable for criminal retaliation.  

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JUDICIAL EFFORTS TO CONCEAL THE EVIDENCE OF
CRIMINAL RETALIATION BY COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER 

My third attorney told me that my case was weak and that it would likely be dismissed by pre-trial judge Oles; shortly thereafter I fired that attorney, and I started to assemble the evidence that supported beyond a reasonable doubt my claim that CMC staged the criminal retaliatory morphine theft in this case.  

Because of the strength of the aforementioned evidence regarding criminal retaliation an effort was made by CMC and every judge/justice who was associated with my case to cover up and/or negate the relevance of that criminal retaliation. 

When I appealed Oles' dismissal of my case I submitted a written argument to the Appellate Division that mentioned twenty four times my claim of the retaliatory criminal set up for morphine theft; of course I also provided the evidence to support my claim. I also stated in my written argument that Oles concealed the evidence of criminal retaliation when he dismissed my case.

However, pre-trial Appellate Division judge Stern who ruled in my favor made no mention in his written opinion of my claim of criminal set up and of the evidence of criminal set up; presumably an unfounded claim of set up that was mentioned twenty four times within a brief written argument would have been at least mentioned and refuted by Stern.

After reading Stern's written opinion I repeatedly requested that he call attention to Oles' attempted concealment of evidence of criminal retaliation; he refused each request.

However, pre-trial Appellate Division judge Stern was not able to completely omit mention of the morphine theft stating that:

"although plaintiff was originally suspended because he was suspected of morphine theft he was never asked to take a drug test".

Appellate Division judge Stern established the relevancy of the morphine theft when he stated in his written opinion that:

"the temporal proximity between his complaint to the State Board of Health in November 2000 and his suspension on January 8 2001 permits an inference of a causal connection."


Appellate Division judge Stern's reference to "causal connection" links my suspension to my complaint to the Board of Health; my suspension was therefore identified by Appellate Division judge Stern, perhaps unintentionally but nevertheless accurately, as the legal element retaliation.

My suspension was therefore relevant to this case.

I was suspended because I was suspected of morphine theft, therefore the morphine theft is also relevant to my case.


Clearly Oles and judge Stern tried to conceal the evidence of criminal set up, however Stern's motive for that attempted concealment was likely due to an attempt to avoid the evidence of Oles' corruption. 

At trial Buczynski attempted to interfere with my establishment of the necessary legal element retaliation. Buczynski objected during my undeniably damaging questioning of a hostile witness regarding narcotic theft.

The aforementioned hostile witness was one of two Saint Barnabas Health Care System employees who investigated the morphine theft. I knew that the investigation was irrelevant to the detection of narcotic theft and that it was transparently harassing since the result of that investigation directly lead to my termination. 

Therefore in order to convince the jury that the investigation was harassing I had to show them that it was irrelevant to the detection of narcotic theft. 

The $5000 trial transcript that Buczynski required that I buy for my post-trial appeal contains his following statement:

THE COURT: Counsel, where's the objection? There's no allegation that he stole anything. And I keep hearing the questions and no objections. It's not relevant to the case.

Judges at trials do not usually make objections. Buczynski attempted to prevent my demonstration of harassment to the jury when he stated that I was not accused of theft. Buczynski clearly planned to prevent the jury from addressing the first act of retaliation (the set up for morphine theft), and he attempted to prevent my establishment of harassment/retaliation regarding my termination for being a substandard record keeper.    

To repeat what was stated prior to trial by Appellate Division judge Stern (a higher court than Buczynski):


"although plaintiff was originally suspended because he was suspected of morphine theft he was never asked to take a drug test".


Buczynski ignored that higher court in order to eliminate the very-relevant criminal retaliatory set up from being addressed at the trial.

My questioning of a hostile witness regarding the morphine theft was arguably damaging to CMC. As previously stated Buczynski wanted me to lose at trial therefore he did not want a jury to pronounce CMC guilty of retaliation let alone egregious criminal retaliation, therefore he protected CMC from being judged by the jury regarding the criminal set up for morphine theft; Buczynski proclaimed in front of the jury that theft was irrelevant to my case.


Buczynski wanted the jury to address only my termination for being a substandard record keeper, and he stated on record that my termination by CMC was justified:

Readers can verify that the above quote was not taken out of context by checking out a brief segment of a transcript photocopy (click to see that transcript segment that appears on page 49).  

The above transcript segment (on page 49) shows that Buczynski, like Oles, attempted to pronounce my record keeping oversights  to be serious, however Buczynski's attempt is pure rhetoric and was  not supported by a single piece of empirical data or tangible evidence.    

My termination represented the second act of retaliation, but it was far less egregious than the criminal retaliation regarding the set up for morphine theft.

Buczynski’s objection (above) also contradicted the reluctant testimony that I forced and evidence already presented by CMC's employees to the jury that I was suspended because of suspicion of morphine theft.

The trial transcript also shows that during my opening statement I told the jury:

MR. MILLER: I’m going to show you that the investigation into my nursing records could not have supported my guilt or innocence regarding that morphine theft. I’m also going to show you evidence that I was set up regarding that morphine theft.


Prior to trial I submitted a written request to Buczynski that the jury address the criminal set up, however he prevented the jury from deciding CMC’s criminal guilt regarding the set up that was the first of two manifestations of a legal element (retaliation); he stated that such a decision by the jury was not needed:

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I think the jury wasn’t allowed to rule on this, it wasn’t a specific question, but I think the evidence showed during the case that the hospital orchestrated that morphine incident and called down upon me the State Enforcement Bureau which is attached to the Attorney General's office. If you don’t call that egregious, I don’t know what is.

THE COURT: Well, you see, I didn’t make a determination. I think that’s a fair argument to be made. You argued that inference to the jury. You had argued that in your closing that, in fact, that you were set up, that you were set up and this was a ploy by someone there to get you fired. That was clear to the jury, I think.

MR. MILLER: But that wasn’t a specific question for them to answer.

THE COURT: No, you wouldn’t ask that question because it’s not—you don’t need to ask that question .

Buczynski’s deliberate effort to prevent the jury from addressing the retaliatory set up, thereby protecting CMC, represented a reversible error that was corruptly ignored by the Appellate Division and by the state Supreme Court.

Buczynski and every other judge who was associated with my case recognized the criminal retaliation by CMC. Buczynski's protection of CMC could have only been motivated by a bribe.

Later at trial after Buczynski's aforementioned objection I requested to be allowed to present the evidence of my losses to the jury in order to obtain the remedies that were the only reason for trial; Buczynski denied my request, and used as an excuse his need to be fair and just. Buczynski had just protected CMC regarding its criminal retaliation, and yet he stated the need to be fair and just.

A reversible error mandates a new trial since it involved the prevention by a judge of a jury's addressing a legal element, in this case the legal element retaliation. By preventing the jury from relevantly deciding CMC's guilt of criminal retaliation Buczynski protected CMC from being held accountable for that offense.


I filed an appeal of a trial that I won. Buczynski's reversible error was one of the two arguments of my appeal, and post-trial Appellate Division judge Kestin was required to address that reversible error.


However Kestin's statement regarding his denial of my appeal made no mention of my claim of reversible error regarding Buczynski's protection of CMC. Kestin made no mention whatsoever of my claim of criminal retaliation.


I was horrified at Kestin's brazen corruption, and although I was aware of the notorious reputation of the New Jersey Supreme Court I filed an appeal of Kestin's denial.


My written argument regarding my appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court prominently mentioned:

a) Oles' attempted concealment of evidence of criminal retaliation;

b) Appellate Division judge Stern's effort to conceal the evidence of criminal retaliation;

c) Buczynski's reversible error regarding his protection of CMC;

d) Kestin's disregard of my claim of reversible error.

The clear disregard of the legislative remedial intent of the whistleblowing law was unquestionably grounds to grant my appeal for a new trial. However the presentation at hand involves the attempted concealment of evidence of criminal retaliation and the corrupt disregard by Kestin of my claim of reversible error. The New Jersey Supreme Court condoned the concealment of evidence of criminal retaliation when it too denied my appeal for a new trial.


A connected interest therefore was successfully protected by a corrupt judiciary from being held accountable for criminal retaliation.
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BUCZYNSKI'S LIE AND FRAUD

Buczynski denied on the last day of trial my request to repeat a trial that I just won, and he lied to me that new trials could only be ordered by the Appellate Division:

MR. MILLER: I wish there was a hung jury and we could do the whole thing over again... so that I could do the trial over and this time introduce evidence of my compensatory losses.

THE COURT: well, the only way that would happen is if the Appellate Division reversed this trial in some way.

MR. MILLER: How about this? Can we take the jury verdict back—

THE COURT: No, we can’t.

MR. MILLER: --that was in my favor?

THE COURT: No.

The above transcript shows that I asked Buczynski on the last day of trial to repeat the trial so that I could obtain the remedies that are the intent of the law; Buczynski responded by denying my request and telling me that new trials could only be ordered by the Appellate Division.

On the last day of the trial Buczynski, instead of instructing me to file a motion with him requesting a new trial, instructed me regarding the filing of an appeal; he also wished me luck regarding the filing of my appeal (click to see a photocopy of this transcript segment).  

I filed my post-trial appeal eleven days after the end of trial.


I was required to submit a $5,000 transcript of the trial as part of my appeal. I made a written request to Buczynski that he order an abbreviated (less costly) transcript for my appeal, and I presented in court twenty nine days after the end of trial to make my argument; this date was 3 March 2006.


Prior to the 3 March court presentation Buczynski was contacted by the Appellate Division after I filed an appeal of a trial that I won; this was my second appeal in this case of decisions made by the Ocean County Superior Court.


The purpose of the 3 March court presentation was to get permission from Buczynski to submit an abbreviated transcript with my appeal. However Buczynski instead invited me to ask him for a new trial before making my appeal to the Appellate Division; this statement shocked and confused me because:

a) Buczynski denied my request on the last day of trial to repeat the trial;
b) Buczynski told me on the last day of trial that new trials can only be ordered by the Appellate Division.

Buczynski not only had the discretion to order a new trial, but he had the discretion to allow me to show the jury the evidence of my losses so that the remedial intent of the law could be honored. Instead Buczynski stated on record that he could not allow me to show the jury the evidence of my losses; his monstrous action therefore ensured my near complete destruction. 

 

(click to see a photocopy of my request and Buczynski's lie that he could not allow me to show the evidence of my losses to the jury, then click the Back button to return)


I did not know on 3 March 2006 that court rules specify a twenty day window after the end of trial during which requests (motions) for a new trial can be made to the trial judge (in this case Buczynski). However at the time of Buczynski's invitation he knew that the window had already closed, therefore that his invitation to request a new trial was worthless.


Buczynski knew that his invitation was worthless, therefore there can be no other reason for that invitation other than his attempt to cover up his lie to me that new trials can only be ordered by the Appellate Division.


A segment of the 3 March transcript follows: 

 

THE COURT: Now, the reason why I actually wanted the argument (for a new trial) on this matter is that under the rules there’s an opportunity for the parties involved to ask the Court for the new trial before they take it up to the Appellate Division and ask the Appellate Division for a new trial. In other words file a brief with this court…and ask this Court…to retry the entire matter. …That’s what happens sometimes where they’ll (the litigants) make the motion for a new trial before the Trial Judge. That wasn’t done here. The Notice of Appeal went up.

 

 

Contrary to the (above) statement on 3 March Buczynski denied my request on record on the last day of trial to repeat the trial. Buczynski also lied to me that new trials could only be ordered by the Appellate Division.


I do not think that Buczynski believed that I would file an appeal of a trial that I won, hence his lie. Buczynski clearly believed that my case would be concluded at the end of trial since an appeal meant prolonging the five year ordeal that I already endured.


The transcript of 3 March 2006 also shows the following exchange:

MR. THIBAULT (
attorney for CMC): The Order was signed, Your Honor, on the 24th.

THE COURT: Just recently?

MR. THIBAULT: Just recently, yes. So we’re still within –

THE COURT: Yes. And in fact, I was holding the Order, anticipating your filing a motion for a new trial before me, anyway, and I was holding that….so I held it (the Final Order)
thinking you were filing a motion before the Court…I was waiting for your motion. And I didn’t get it, so I figured I’d better sign the Court Order (Final Order) now. And then I saw there was the Notice of Appeal.

 

 

Buczynski, who was offering to me on 3 March a chance to ask for a new trial, lied to me on record on the last day of trial that new trials could only be ordered by the Appellate Division. There was no reason for Buczynski to expect that I would again ask him for a new trial, therefore his excuse that he was waiting for my motion (request) is a lie. Buczynski knew that the window had closed at the time of his worthless invitation to me, and CMC’s attorney (who probably was not in on the deception) unwittingly reminded Buczynski on record that he signed the Final Order on the 24th (of February) that implied the closure of the twenty day window .


I now know that trial judges routinely wait for the closure of the aforementioned twenty day window before signing the Final Order that precludes their granting of new trials.

 

 

(click to see a photocopy of the Final Order that Buczynski knew precluded him from offering his worthless invitation)

In response to the invitation I filed a motion five days later on 8 March for a new trial; Buczynski denied on 31 March that request because the twenty day window had closed. Buczynski incredibly claimed on 31 March ignorance of the court rule regarding the twenty day window. 
 

 

(click to see a photocopy of the segments of the 3 March transcript that were referenced above)________________________________________________

CORRUPTION OF THE POST-TRIAL APPELLATE DIVISION

Prejudice refers to judicial actions that disregard the facts that contradict those actions. I learned because of my encounter with Oles that corrupt judges lie, prejudicially ignore relevant facts and case law, and state half truths in order to support their corrupt decisions.

Appellate Division judge Kestin issued a brief written statement regarding his denial of my appeal that:

a. prejudicially made no mention of the remedial legislative intent of the whistle blowing law that pertained to the primary argument of my appeal ;

 note: The ignoring of legislative intent is an example of prejudice since that well-established intent contradicted the denial of my appeal. Presumably one does not need to be a graduate of a law school in order to recognize that the primary argument of my appeal should have been addressed by Kestin.


b. prejudicially cited no case law relevant to the whistle blowing law;

note: Those in the legal profession will know that the case law relevant to a litigation is an integral part of any associated judicial opinion.


c. prejudicially made no mention of the evidence of Buczynski’s bias and prejudice that I presented in detail, but instead stated that ‘plaintiff received a fair trial’;


d. prejudicially made no mention of my claim of reversible error that he was required to address;


e. stated the half truth that I did not present to the jury evidence of my losses, while omitting mention that I made a request on record, moments after being notified by Buczynski of my unknowing error, that I be allowed to make such a presentation;


f. prejudicially made no mention of Buczynski’s fraud that I presented in detail regarding his worthless invitation (mentioned above) that was relevant to my appeal;


g. purposefully and unnecessarily lied that I did not request a new trial from Buczynski until two months after the end of trial, stating that:

"Plaintiff’s notice of motion for a new trial was untimely…and was
filed on March 31, 2006, almost two months after the jury rendered its verdict on February 2…a motion for a new trial must be made within twenty days of the jury verdict."

note: My appeal was based on only two arguments: Buczynski's reversible error regarding his protection of CMC regarding its criminal retaliation; and his ignoring of the well-established remedial intent of the law. My appeal had nothing to do with an "untimely" motion, therefore Kestin's patent lie was irrelevant and unnecessary.

I prominently stated in my written argument to Kestin that I requested on the last day of trial to repeat the trial, and that Buczynski told me that new trials could only be ordered by the Appellate Division; yet Kestin lied that I did not request a new trial until two months after the jury returned its verdict in my favor.

(click to see a photocopy of my date-stamped motion that I filed 8 March 2006 with the Ocean County court clerk; Kestin lied that I did not file that motion until 31 March. Click the Back button to return to the presentation).
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CORRUPTION OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT

The state Supreme Court denied in March of 2008 my request to argue for a new trial so that I could recover the losses that I incurred as a result of my action on behalf of others.


The blatant defeat by a demonstrably biased Buczynski of the remedial legislative intent of the whistle blowing law was not only an undeniable basis to allow me to argue for a new trial, but it was also undeniable grounds to grant a new trial. Consistent with the seemingly complete corruption of the New Jersey judiciary the clerk of the state Supreme Court stated in writing that the justices do not agree with my allegations of judicial corruption.

 

Most informed New Jersey citizens are presumably aware that the state Supreme Court disregards the state’s constitution and laws at will.

The New Jersey Supreme Court was once referred to by Gannett newspaper reporter Bob Ingle (author of The Soprano State) as a "robed clan of clowns".

The corruption of the state Supreme Court was exposed in my case not only because of its disregard of legislative intent but also by a disregard of its own position regarding the whistle blowing law. In a decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court dated 27 July 2007 (D’Annuzio v. Prudential Insurance Co., 192 N.J. 110, 927 A.2d 113)
it was stated:

"CEPA is remedial social legislation designed to promote two complementary public purposes: to protect and thereby encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities… our goal in the interpretation of a statute is always to determine the
legislature’s intent… a single guiding principle has instructed our interpretation of CEPA in the decades since its enactment. As broad, remedial legislation the statute must be construed liberally".


It is obvious that in my case involving the Saint Barnabas Health Care System the New Jersey Supreme Court completely disregarded their own position regarding the remedial intent of the whistleblowing law. The New Jersey Supreme Court also compounded Kestin's corruption regarding his ignoring my claim of reversible error.


A further insult to the well-established intent of the whistle blowing law was the order by the New Jersey Supreme Court that I pay $463 to CMC to compensate it for its clerical cost of fighting my appeal that was necessitated by Kestin's brazen corruption.


Faced with a completely corrupt judiciary whistle blowing is folly. The judicial actions in my case ensure that conscientious whistle blowing is discouraged rather than encouraged, and society arguably suffers as a result.
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THE SALE OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AT THE OCEAN COUNTY (NJ) SUPERIOR COURT

The sale of law demonstrated herein is without doubt routine at the Ocean County Superior Court.
 
In the summer of 2008 Ocean County Superior Court judge Thomas O’Brien protected CMC by dismissing my small claims litigation, just like Oles dismissed my whistle blowing case, regarding my attempt to recover $15,000* of earned-not-taken vacation time money that I had accumulated at the time of the morphine theft set up that ended my employment.

*At the time of my suspension for suspected morphine theft the value of my unused vacation time was $13,000; with interest this value increased to at least $15,000 that was the maximum amount that could be addressed in a small claims court.


The CMC employee handbook states that earned-not-taken
vacation time money is reimbursed to an employee who resigns from CMC, but CMC refused to reimburse that money to me after my termination, and Buczynski refused on record to order CMC to reimburse that money to me after my win at trial.

In my filing papers regarding my small claims case I stated my distrust in any Ocean County Superior Court judge, and that I wanted a jury to decide if I have a right to money that I earned no less than I earned my last paycheck; a jury would of course award that earned vacation time money to me, but CMC factually violates criminal and civil law with impunity because it clearly enjoys the protection of the demonstrably corrupt Ocean County Superior Court that prevents easily won cases from reaching a jury.

O’Brien refused to allow my case to reach a jury, thereby ensuring that a jury could not formally proclaim CMC guilty of staging the morphine theft that directly lead to my wrongful termination.

O’Brien praised on record the honesty of Oles and Buczynski who are both demonstrably corrupt judges and brazen liars.

O’Brien was also aware of the overwhelming evidence of the sale of criminal and civil law to CMC, yet a corrupt O’Brien accused me on record of not believing in the law because I had the temerity to seek justice during my seven year quest during which I repeatedly encountered the brazen corruption of his brethren.
 
O’Brien is presumably controlled by the same political boss who demonstrably corrupted Oles and Buczynski; a rational reader can therefore conclude O’Brien’s corruption especially after he protected CMC from being judged by a jury regarding my attempt to recover money that I already earned at the time of CMC’s retaliation against me.

I did not appeal O’Brien’s ruling that not only compounded the blatant defeat of the whistle blowing law but that he demonstrably enjoyed handing down; O’Brien actually smiled when I stated in court that I would not appeal his decision because of the likelihood of encountering further stated judicial corruption that I curiously escaped at the time of my pre-trial appeal. O’Brien also warned me on record that if I appeal his ruling the denial of that appeal would be accompanied by a demand by CMC for costs.
 

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