10 October 2005

From: David A. Miller

66 G Street

Seaside Park NJ 08752

To: Francis Buczynski

Re: Miller v. Community Medical Center et al.

Docket No OCN-L-2275-01

Subject: testimony of Edward Oles and Eugene Serpentelli at trial


Dear Judge Buczynski:

This case clearly demonstrates that Edward Oles and Eugene Serpentelli acted on behalf of Community Medical Center (hereinafter Community) in the complete absence of evidence in Community’s favor and in the overwhelming presence of evidence against Community.

Oles and Serpentelli were the first two Ocean County Superior Court judges that I encountered. That the first judge (Oles) that I encountered was both demonstrably corrupt and clearly biased in favor of Community could be explained by either coincidence or by the argument that both corruption and bias in favor of the politically connected is the rule rather than the exception at the Ocean County Superior Court. A rational mind would agree that since the second encountered judge deliberately ignored overwhelming evidence of criminal activity by Community an argument of coincidence is statistically eliminated.

The circumstantial evidence in this case supports the argument that Community was protected by Ocean County Superior Court judicial bias. I will argue that this protection equated to an agreement to aid regarding Community’s stealing of my identity and subsequently falsely implicating me in morphine theft. This agreement to aid, mentioned regarding the establishment of a legal element of conspiracy (Criminal Jury Charges re: NJSA 2C:5-2), was either made prior to the commission of the crime in question or it was made after the fact in which case Oles and Serpentelli could easily be proven guilty of criminally hindering prosecution.

There can be no credible dispute against the argument that Oles and Serpentelli did in fact ignore the violation of criminal law by Community. I will argue in front of a jury that the agreement to aid was manifested by a sure knowledge that judges at the Ocean County Superior Court will in fact ignore violations of law by the politically connected; I will argue that this sure knowledge was possessed by both Community and by Ocean County Superior Court judges.

It is further argued regarding an agreement to aid that the brazenness of Oles’ corruption supports the argument that in New Jersey corruption is inherently politically and judicially protected at the state and county levels. The facts in this case show that not only did the judicial oversight Advisory Committee for Judicial Conduct (hereinafter ACJC) cover up Oles’ corruption, but so too did the Appellate Division (hereinafter AD) and the New Jersey Supreme Court (hereinafter NJSC). I suspect that Oles did not request the protection of the ACJC, the AD, and the NJSC either before or after his brazenly corrupt granting of Summary Judgment in this case, nevertheless it cannot be credibly argued that a statewide conspiracy, or an agreement to aid, does not exist to cover up instances of judicial corruption. Indeed, that the Ocean County Prosecutor stonewalled my numerous attempts to expose the criminal activity and corruption in this case demonstrates that the politically connected in Ocean County who commit crimes are protected from prosecution. I also suspect that neither Oles or Community requested protection from the Ocean County Prosecutor before or after the commission of crimes; the sure knowledge of protection was however surely possessed by Oles and by Community along with the sure knowledge by the Ocean County Prosecutor that he would protect the politically connected who commit crimes or who are corrupt. To repeat, it is argued that protection or an agreement to aid is inherent in a state in which corruption is pervasive even at the highest levels of the justice system.

It is a jury’s decision regarding whether or not an agreement to aid has been proven, in a civil matter, by a mere preponderance of the evidence. It is a jury’s decision whether or not a conspiracy can exist without direct communication between conspirators regarding an agreement to aid. It is not necessary, according to the Criminal Jury Charge, to produce a witness who testifies that Oles and Serpentelli stated their agreement to aid Community; the jury can determine if there was an agreement to aid by ‘‘inferences from conduct, words, or acts’’. In consideration of the public’s outrage at the state’s ubiquitous corruption, I suggest that you already know a jury’s position regarding the establishment of an agreement to aid.

The second element regarding conspiracy requires the demonstration that Oles’ and Serpentelli’s purpose was to facilitate the commission of the crime in question. I will argue in my closing to the jury that Community’s stealing of my identity and falsely implicating me in morphine theft was facilitated because of their sure knowledge of a judicial agreement to aid by the judges at the Ocean County Superior Court if their crime was discovered. I suggest that the decision or the planning to rob a bank teller is facilitated if the robber knows that he faces no possibility of punishment if caught. It is a point in fact that Oles and Serpentelli ignored the evidence of easily-proven criminal activity by Community. Thus the second legal element demonstrating conspiracy is easily established.

Lastly, there can be little doubt based upon the evidence in your possession that I will convince a jury that identified representatives of Community stole my identity and falsely implicated me in morphine theft. Thus the third and last element is established that is required to demonstrate the conspiracy involvement of Oles and Serpentelli.

The trial of this case requires that I establish the legal element of causal connection regarding the triable issue of whether Community violated New Jersey’s whistle blowing law. Establishing in a civil matter the legal elements of criminal conspiracy is relevant in this case because a jury will be more inclined to accept my arguments for a causal connection if it can be demonstrated that Oles and Serpentelli were part of a conspiracy to steal my identity and to falsely implicate me in morphine theft. In other words, if I can demonstrate to a jury that Community had sure knowledge of judicial protection, a jury would be more inclined to accept my argument of causal connection.

Regarding sure knowledge of an agreement to aid, I will show that defendants knew before October 2003 that Oles would grant them Summary Judgment at that time. Defendants knew that their legal position was nonexistent and that my position was overwhelming, therefore it would seem that defendants would want to mitigate sure damages by expert testimony on their behalf at trial. However, defendants clearly considered an expert on their behalf to be unnecessary since they knew that the fix was in regarding Summary Judgment. No expert was retained by defendants prior to the setting aside in May 2005 of Oles’ corrupt granting of Summary Judgment. Such an expert recently prepared a negative evaluation, not surprisingly, of my efforts to become re-employed.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, supposedly authored by a past New Jersey Supreme Court, proscribes toleration of judicial corruption. This case is not the only one that highlights the NJSC’s disregard of the state’s laws and constitution, therefore in the presence of a demonstrably corrupt NJSC a code of ethics is seemingly meaningless. Nevertheless, this code specifically provides for the testimony of judges who have knowledge relevant to a case undergoing trial, therefore Oles and Serpentelli cannot be, at least ethically, shielded from giving testimony. Admittedly, my argument to adhere to a code of judicial ethics is weak considering the atmosphere of corruption.


The following summarizes the evidence of brazen corruption of Edward Oles and makes references to an Appellate Division brief, reply, and appendix which are not included; those materials were however previously provided to Francis Buczynski, Eugene Serpentelli, the Ocean County Prosecutor, the ACJC, the AD, and to the NJSC.

Oles clearly and deliberately perverted the tenets of Brill regarding Summary Judgment as demonstrated by his written opinion (appendix 56a-63a). Oles made a pretense of ‘‘viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff’’ (appendix 57a:7), however he instead completely concealed facts favorable to plaintiff, and completely concealed facts damaging to Community.

Oles concealed the establishment of pretext for termination (Brief 43) and instead demonstrated clear intellectual dishonesty regarding such an establishment (Brief 43), and brazenly lied in his written opinion that pretext has not been established (appendix 63a:1-4, 141a, 156a:19-21). Pretext was clearly established by a written hospital policy (141a) that indicated two successive written reprimands followed by two successive suspensions before termination for record keeping offenses ; in this case, the first of two written reprimands was indicated.

Oles concealed evidence that Community fabricated a charting standard which was also evidence of pretext for termination (Brief 35)(Reply item #9/pages 9-10). I was officially terminated for ‘‘substandard charting’’ regarding my record keeping practice, however it was demonstrated that no charting standard exists at Community, nor was an official definition of a charting standard provided by Community. Yet Oles stated ‘‘there is absolutely no evidence’’ of pretext for termination (62a/line 14).

In the final paragraph of his written statement regarding Summary Judgment, Oles stated that ‘‘plaintiff has failed to present any evidence either direct or circumstantial’’ of pretext for termination (63a/1-4).

Oles concealed proof of material perjury by Community administrator Burke and by corporate director Manzo (Brief 28-32).

Oles concealed a multitude of clear evidence of conspiracy by Community regarding the orchestration of the morphine incident under my PIN, and ignored overwhelming evidence of, in Oles’ words, ‘‘a criminal matter’’ implicating Community (appendix 183a/12:21). Clearly, Oles recognized but concealed evidence of criminal activity by Community which included: violation of the federal Identity Theft Act, USC Title 18 section 1028; violation of NJSA 2C:21-17(theft of identity); violation of NJSA 2C:2-6/2C:5-2(conspiracy); and violation of NJSA 2C:28-1(perjury). No mention whatsoever was made in Oles’ written opinion(appendix 56a-63a) of the central evidence of the litigation that supported Community’s guilt that they orchestrated the morphine incident (Brief 17-32)(Reply item #10/pages 10-11); no mention was made by Oles of the existence of this evidence; no effort was made by Oles to refute this evidence.

Oles concealed the fact of the absence of competent testimony that my record keeping oversights were serious, yet he clearly attempted to pronounce those oversights to be serious; for example, Oles stated during oral argument ‘‘the fact that I got Percocet and it’s not charted, you don’t think that’s serious?’’(appendix 180a/ 6:18-19). When I challenged Oles to explain the seriousness of such a charting oversight, Oles stated his fear of Percocet addiction (appendix 180a/7:24-25) that was not supported by evidence in the record, nor does supporting evidence exist outside the record.

Oles was unqualified to pronounce that I was guilty of poor nursing practice (appendix 62a:13), yet such a prejudiced pronouncement was made in the absence of supporting evidence. Demonstrably meaningless charting errors do not translate to poor nursing practice. On the contrary, my nursing performance was documented to be above average (appendix 105a-108a). Further, Oles stated that I admitted to poor nursing practices; there is no evidence that I made such an admission (appendix 178a-186a)(Brief 41:5); I did however admit to making demonstrably meaningless charting oversights.

Oles repeated allegations in his written opinion against me that were previously proven false regarding my failure to make unnecessary special time notations regarding administered medications, and regarding my removal of Xanax without authorization (Brief page 21 item #10) (Reply item #1/pages 1-5)(appendix 60a:9-23).

Oles made a statement in his written opinion (appendix 57a:20) that I would be held accountable for the illicit morphine removal under my PIN despite overwhelming evidence in the record that Community orchestrated the morphine incident; this statement by Oles clearly demonstrates his attempt to conceal the evidence of the orchestration.

Oles ignored a tenet of Brill that allowed an inference of a prelude to pretext for termination regarding the undeniably irrelevant investigation which was not required by a protocol of my nursing records (Brief items #7-9/pages 17-21) which directly lead to my termination. Not only did he conceal clear evidence of harassment in his written opinion, but Oles made a clear effort to legitimize the harassment by Community as demonstrated during oral argument, stating ‘‘but they did do an investigation’’ in response to my argument that Community conducted a harassing, irrelevant investigation of my nursing records after the morphine incident(appendix 182a/10:7-9).

Oles ignored the inference that follows from the existence of the UNREPORTED (uncharted) SCHEDULED MEDS printout (appendix 131a) and that follows from the existence of a policy that addresses disciplinary action for making record keeping omissions, namely that record keeping omissions are inherent to staff nursing (appendix 141a), hence the irrelevant and harassing investigation of my nursing records after the morphine incident which lead to my termination.

Oles made a clear effort in his written opinion to conceal Community’s incredible attempt to defeat causal connection regarding his statement that ‘‘Nancy Wollen, an employee of the hospital’’ was informed of my Board of Health complaint one week after the fact (appendix 58a:5). Wollen is indeed an employee who also happens to be the Executive Director of Community, a fact conveniently omitted by Oles. Although admitting that Wollen knew of my Board of Health complaint, Community claims that nursing administrator Burke, who terminated me, was kept unaware by Community and by their attorney of my Board of Health complaint until the first deposition in this case eleven months after Community’s receipt of the legal complaint claiming violation of the whistle blowing law (Brief item #2/page 15).

In addition to his brazen lie that pretext for termination has not been established, Oles brazenly lied in his written opinion that ‘‘Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment which would support a finding of a causal connection’’ (appendix 62a:7-10); this statement is clearly more than abuse of discretion, and translates to his concealment on behalf of Community of clear and overwhelming evidence that they orchestrated the morphine incident shortly after they were informed of my Board of Health complaint(appendix 183a/12:21). The proof of orchestration is not by merely a preponderance of the evidence, but is beyond a reasonable doubt.

Oles granted Summary Judgment based solely upon a demonstrably meaningless list of record keeping errors; without meaning, the list of errors is immaterial. Evidence that I administered digoxin to a patient without first taking the patient’s temperature is immaterial unless the meaning of such an inaction is explained. Therefore it is accurate to state that Oles’ written opinion, in which he detailed each demonstrably meaningless record keeping error, is completely meaningless (appendix 56a-63a). Oles made his absurd comment about Percocet addiction (appendix 180a/7:24) specifically because he had no evidence that my charting oversights were serious or in any way meaningful, yet he was clearly attempting to establish that the oversights were serious (‘‘the fact that I got Percocet and it’s not charted, you don’t think that’s serious? ’’, appendix 180a/ 6:18-19). No evidence or competent testimony in the record supports the argument that the errors were anything other than meaningless. Oles instead ignored my reasoned and educated argument that the oversights were meaningless (Brief 36-41). Oles was aware that prior to becoming an RN I was a nine-year research chemist, therefore he knew that I was not precluded from having a clear understanding of pharmacology simply because I was not a physician; indeed, deposition transcript by a Community nursing administrator, presented to Oles, was that I had an above average knowledge of pharmacology.

Oles granted Summary Judgment to Community in the complete absence of evidence in their favor, in the clear presence of damaging evidence against Community, and in the overwhelming presence of evidence in my favor which clearly established all of the required legal elements in this case.



The evidence against Oles is overwhelming, yet Eugene Serpentelli, in a letter to me dated 2 May 2005, clearly attempted to cover up Oles’ corruption and his criminal activity, stating ‘‘I see no basis for the court to take action regarding your allegations’’. The evidence provided for the demonstration of Oles’ corruption and criminal activity necessarily also demonstrated the criminal activity of Community, yet this evidence against Community was clearly ignored by Serpentelli.

In the same letter dated 2 May 2005, Serpentelli attempted to compound deceit originated by the AD; this deceit by the AD is especially brazen regarding an instruction to bring my evidence to the attention of the notoriously incompetent, political hack Attorney General, or to the stonewalling Ocean County Prosecutor. As previously stated, the Ocean County Prosecutor completely ignored my numerous attempts to have the evidence against Oles presented to a grand jury. Judges do not prosecute, but a higher court can insist upon prosecution in the instance of prosecutorial and/or judicial abuse of discretion (State v. Ward, 303 NJ Super. 47, 52 App Div 1997), and I explicitly requested the AD to order the demonstrably stonewalling Ocean County Prosecutor to take action. Yet the AD deliberately dodged my request for an insistence and instead perverted my request by implying that I requested the AD to prosecute.

Serpentelli’s letter dated 2 May 2005 omits mention of my statement that I recently (at that time) became aware of the possibility that Oles must first be impeached by the NJSC prior to a grand jury presentation of evidence. The NJSC eventually denied my motion to respect its constitutional mandate to address Oles’ and Serpentelli’s corruption. Clearly, according to my letter dated 21 March 2005, I did not want to abandon my efforts with the Ocean County Prosecutor if in fact Oles had to be first impeached. Clearly, an impeachment mechanism did not preclude the presentation to a grand jury of the evidence of criminal wrong doing by Community regardless of my request; presumably, if I had presented irrefutable evidence of murder to Serpentelli he would not disregard the evidence regardless of my subsequent request.


In closing, a rationale for the appearance of Oles and Serpentelli at trial has been presented. As you know, the NJSC denied my request for a change of venue despite undeniable proof of judicial corruption and bias at the Ocean County Superior Court. I know that there is an excellent probability that the trial of this case will be judicially biased, regardless of the evidence, in Community’s favor since there is reason explained herein to expect that the judges at the Ocean County Superior Court have the same ethics as Oles and Serpentelli, the judges of the AD, and the justices of the NJSC.


David A. Miller


Cc: Editor/ Asbury Park Press

Editor/ Ocean County Observer

J. Blaney

J. Citta

J. Clyne

J. Courtney

W. Daniels

M. Ford

J. Foster

S. Franklin

V. Grasso

R. Hoffman

T. Kelaher

E. Millard

T. O’Brien

E. Oles

J. Peterson

A. Pogarsky

E. Serpentelli

J. Strelecki

A. Thibault

E. Turnbach

B. Villano


Web Hosting Companies